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Abstract
Public and private actors have suggested using the community land trust (CLT) model as a
remedy for a number of housing related issues. This is based primarily upon the documented
successes of CLT homeownership programs. Some caution that the growth of CLTs and the
increased use of the CLT model beyond homeownership may stretch organizations beyond their
capacity or force them to consider how to provide stewardship and community control. The
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) has been used by a handful of CLTs and there are
reasons to believe that more CLTs may utilize it in the future. This thesis explores the
opportunities and challenges that using LIHTC may present for CLTs through case studies with
two different types of organizations--a grassroots CLT in Athens, GA and a nonprofit housing
developer with a CLT program in Park City, UT--that have used it as a funding source.
Keywords: Community Land Trusts, CLTs, Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, LIHTC, permanent
affordability
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Part I: Introduction
Although they represent a very small segment of the affordable housing industry,
community land trusts (CLTs) have gained recognition for their approach to permanently
affordably housing supported by ongoing stewardship and a philosophy of community control.
Proponents of the CLT model argue convincingly that it is able to produce the highest and
longest returns on public investments in affordable housing through subsidy retention (Davis,
1995; Cohen, 1994). This fiscally conservative approach has gained the interest of cities1 and
foundations seeking to address issues ranging from gentrification to vacant land management,
especially given that government subsidies for affordable housing have dwindled in recent
decades. CLTs are now considering ways of “bringing the model to scale” (increasing the
production of units) and cite identifying “reliable sources of funding” as one of the major
obstacles the sector faces (McCarthy, 2012). Meanwhile, Agnotti (2007) argues that there are
reasons to be “wary of major new increases in CLT production” as “the history of CDCs is
littered with the remains of community-based developers that tried to leap into large scale
development without the management capacity to do so” (p.2). Jacobus and Brown (2007) add
that municipal involvement in CLTs is likely to “increase the number of CLT units nationwide
and raise the profile of the CLT approach” but warn, “that very visibility will stretch the nascent
CLT movement in new and untried directions.”
Although the bulk of the literature on CLTs focuses on the benefits of the CLT model of
homeownership, nationwide, CLTs also own and operate more units of rental housing than they
do homeownership units2 (Sungu-Eryilmaz & Greenstein, 2007; Thaden, 2012). It has been
shown that the owners of CLT homes weathered the recent housing market meltdown much
better than the owners of non-CLT homes (Temkin, Theodos & Price, 2010), but there is good
reason to believe that policymaker’s faith in affordable homeownership has been shaken.
Mortgage underwriting guidelines have become more stringent, the real estate market is soft
and the CLT model of homeownership is still unfamiliar to many lending institutions (McCarthy,
2012). Considering that the need for affordable rental housing never abated when
homeownership rates soared in the early 2000s and may now be more severe than ever (Joint
Center for Housing Studies, 2012), CLTs seem likely to expand their affordable rental holdings in
the future to best serve the greatest need in the communities where they operate.
The question of how CLTs fund this expansion is critical. One possibility is the expanded
use of the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC). A handful of CLTs—10 according to my
research—have already used LIHTC to finance affordable rental housing. In her Results of the
2011 Comprehensive CLT Survey, Thaden (2012) found that just 2% of CLTs cited LIHTC as a
source of funding in 2010. It can be expected that as the CLT model matures and as other
sources of funding for affordable housing dwindle, more will follow suit. LIHTC is currently the
1

Jacobus & Brown (2007) note that governments have “taken the lead” in sponsoring CLTs in the following cities:
Irvine, California; Chicago, Illinois; Austin, Texas; Delray Beach, Florida; Highland Park, Illinois; and Chaska,
Minnesota.
2
The Sungu-Eryilmaz & Greenstein (2007) survey revealed that 95% of CLTs reported having homeownership units
in their portfolio while 45% of CLTs reported having rental units in their portfolio.
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largest source of federal funding for affordable rental housing and is estimated to play a role in
financing between 50-70% of all new contractually affordable housing produced annually
(Smith, 2002). Units financed with LIHTC must remain affordable for a period of at least 15
years3 at which point market-rate conversion becomes a possible outcome and a cause for
concern. Because of their commitment to permanent affordability, CLTs can render this point
moot. This, in turn, can lead to higher and longer returns on public investments.
If the need to find the best use of the limited financial resources for affordable housing
is important, the question of how CLTs have used LIHTC—and fared while doing so--deserves to
be explored. LIHTC is a complex source of funding that produces large multi-family
developments, requires rigorous compliance monitoring and invites competition between
nonprofit and for-profit developers for a limited annual allocation of awards. The complexity of
the program often makes partnerships between less experienced nonprofit developers and forprofit developers a necessity (Bratt, 2007). Using LIHTC also has the potential to create forms
of property ownership (in the form of development partnerships in which CLTs do not
necessarily own the land underlying a rental project) and tenant-owner relations that are
unfamiliar to CLTs whose development experience is limited to homeownership. This, in turn,
may force CLTs to question how to best align their operations with key CLT ideologies such as
stewardship and community control. This thesis is intended to spur though and conversation
by exploring the opportunities and challenges that the use of the LIHTC has for CLTs. The goal is
to provide CLTs that are considering scaling up (or organizations interested in employing the
CLT model) with a series of “lessons learned” from those experiences.
This is achieved through case studies based on interviews with the executive leadership
of two very different CLTs that have used LIHTC. Athens Land Trust is a grassroots CLT that
used LIHTC to fund its first rental housing development: a 120-unit mixed income complex that
effectively tripled the size of its real estate portfolio. Mountainlands Community Housing Trust
is a more traditional nonprofit affordable housing producer with a CLT program that has used
LIHTC to fund both preservation and new construction. Its leadership is interested applying the
CLT model ground lease to future LIHTC projects in order to generate income and maintain site
control. During the interviews, I addressed the following fundamental questions:
1) How have CLTs used LIHTC to increase the production of permanently affordable
housing?
2) What are the difficulties that arise during the development process?
3) How are CLTs planning to keep their LIHTC projects affordable at Year 15 or 30 and
beyond?
4) Is stewardship extended to the tenants of CLT-owned LIHTC projects? If so, how?

3

Beginning in 1989, IRS rules changed the required affordability period from 15 to 30 years. Although after 15
years, monitoring responsibility shifts from the IRS to state HFAs, which can pursue legal action if projects fall out
of compliance, but lack the authority to reclaim tax credits.
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The case studies show that there is no one-size-fits-all approach for CLTs that use LIHTC and
that the rental component of an overall affordable housing strategy is viewed differently by
different types of CLTs. Anecdotal evidence indicates that the documented difficulties of using
LIHTC seem to persist no matter what an organization’s structure or capacity and that CLTs
overcome them in much the same way as traditional nonprofit affordable housing producers
do. Permanent affordability is viewed as a given by both organizations though a lack of firm
long-range financial plans persist. Athens, the grassroots CLT, takes a much more hands on
approach to stewardship than Mountainlands, though the latter is beginning to recognize the
importance of stewardship for homeowners and for tenants.
This thesis is composed of 6 parts. In Part II, I begin with a literature review that
explains the CLT model, discusses the concept of “permanent affordability” and examines the
LIHTC program. I discuss the merits of and current interest in the CLT model and explain how
those are complementary to the design of the LIHTC Program. In Part III, I explain my research
methodology and case studies selections. In Parts IV and V, I introduce my case studies:
Athens Land Trust based in Athens, GA and Mountainlands Community Housing Trust based in
Park City, UT. Part VI is a discussion and comparison of the case studies incorporating lessons
learned from both the positive and negative experiences that they encountered when using
LIHTC.
Part II: CLTs and LIHTC: A Pathway to Permanent Affordability?
This research fits into the broader literature on the opportunities and challenges facing
CLTs as they attempt to increase the output of permanently affordable housing. The purpose of
this literature review is to examine the implications that LIHTC may have for CLTs that use it as
a tool for development. This section begins with a description of the CLT model and the LIHTC
program and then covers literature on CLTs as owners of rental housing with the goals of scale
and permanent affordability in mind. I conclude with a list of CLTs that have used LIHTC and a
more in depth examination of the characteristics of the LIHTC program that may be of special
interest to CLTs.
The Community Land Trust Model
The CLT model is an innovative means by which to expand and preserve the stock of
affordable housing on a permanent basis. When compared to other nonprofit affordable
housing producers, the defining feature of a CLT model is its commitment to “permanent
affordability” or the tendency to think of land as a public good or community asset that should
be held in perpetuity for the common good (Davis, 2010). Proponents of the CLT model view it
as an effective way to keep land in a community affordable for low- and moderate-income
individuals4 in spite of factors such as rising land prices and real estate speculation. CLTs also
have a role in revitalizing and stabilizing areas with “weak markets” with “high foreclosures”
4

The CLT model can be used to provide owner-occupied housing for any income level; however the majority of CLT
housing is for low and moderate-income households. (Thaden, 2012)
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where issues related to gentrification may not be the overarching concern (Corey, 2009). The
CLT model of affordability can trace its roots back to Henry George and Ebenezer Howard and
was designed to address issues surrounding community control and the affordability of land
and housing. A lack of community control and affordability can be viewed as symptoms of our
private system of land ownership (Davis, 2010) or as stemming from neoliberalism (DeFilippis,
2001 & 2004).
Though a CLT may operate in much the same way as a traditional community
development corporation (CDC)—and indeed some of the largest and most successful CLTs
began as CDCs—there is one fundamental difference between the two types of organizations
that should be explained. Davis (1994), argues that it is important to “draw some distinction
between non-market forms of housing tenure that preserve affordability and a non-profit mode
of housing production that relies primarily on community-based organizations for its impetus
and implementation. A true third sector housing policy will always include the first; it will often
include the second” (p.8). The difference is the CLT commitment to making land a permanent
affordability community asset and is the feature of the model that is of predominant interest to
municipalities and funders interested in establishing a new CLT or scaling up an existing CLT
(Jacobus & Brown, 2007).
CLTs achieve permanent affordability through dual-ownership of land. The CLT removes
the cost of land from the price of housing by separating ownership of the two. The CLT (taking
the form of a private, nonprofit 501(c)3 corporation acquires parcels of land in its operating
area with the intent of retaining ownership of the land for the long term. The CLT then
provides the land for private use through long-term (typically 99-year) ground lease
agreements.5 Leaseholders may own the structures (homes, multi-family buildings, commercial
structures, etc.) but the resale of these structures is restricted in terms of price, buyer eligibility,
occupancy and use in ways that retain the subsidy for the next owner. The idea of the “locking
the subsidy in place” (Davis, 2007) is what makes CLTs so attractive when budgets are tight at
all levels of government and federal housing policy has largely moved to a model of devolution
where housing in concerned.
The CLT is also thought to “enhance the mobility” of low-income people by “inserting
new rungs into a locality’s housing ladder” (Davis, 2007). If the top of the ladder is market-rate
homeownership and the bottom of the ladder is market-rate rental, CLT-owned
homeownership and rental properties or other limited and shared equity arrangements fall
somewhere in the middle. The idea is, the more rungs on the ladder, the easier it is to move up
(or down) should an individual choose to do so.

5

In the case of rental housing a CLT may own the land or the land and the structure. They may rent individual
units in a building to tenants via traditional 1-year leases or may rent an entire building to a third-party who then
leases units to individuals. It should also be noted that the CLT-model ground lease is a legal mechanism available
to non-CLT affordable housing producers.
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The second feature that sets CLTs apart from other nonprofit housing providers is the
notion of stewardship, which can be thought of as the ongoing and supportive relationship they
maintain with their homeowners or tenants (White, 2011). CLTs require and often provide, preand post-purchase homeowner education, “oversight and support to preserve affordability,
promote sound maintenance, prevent foreclosures and ensure the longevity and success of the
homeownership opportunity” (Thaden, 2011: 2). These “backstopping” measures have enabled
many first-time homebuyers to become and remain successful homeowners. Temkin, Theodos
and Price (2010) found that more than 50% of low-income, first time homebuyers transition
back to renting within five years of purchasing a home, because they are unable to keep up
with the terms of their mortgages, cannot afford rising property taxes and insurance or fail to
plan for unforeseen repairs and maintenance. CLT homeowners have lower rates of default
and foreclosure compared with national, conventional mortgage loan holders, largely due to
the security and investment provided by the CLT model (Thaden, 2011).
The National Community Land Trust network explains that in addition to providing
affordable housing to individuals who may otherwise lack access, CLTs also have the purpose of
increasing community control of neighborhood resources and empowering residents through
involvement and participation in the organization (National Community Land Trust Network,
n.d.). Diverse community interests are balanced by the election of a tri-partite board of
trustees composed of CLT leaseholders, non-lease holding community members who reside in
the CLT’s service area and professionals representing the public interest (Davis, 2010).
However, not all CLTs are governed this way and many CLTs do not have a single resident who
lives in a CLT-owned unit on its board of trustees (Thaden, 2012:13).
The CLT model certainly has not gone “mainstream” since the first CLT was established
in 1968. McCarthy (2012) notes that less than 2% of the nation’s housing stock is in sharedequity (and an even smaller portion of that in CLT-owned housing). Today, there are over 250
CLTs operating in 45 states and the District of Columbia (Thaden, 2012) up from approximately
160 in 2005 (Greenstein & Sungu-Eryilmaz, 2005). Most of the literature on CLTs focuses on the
benefits of single-family, owner-occupied housing under the CLT model. However, nationwide,
CLTs collective own and operate a stock of rental housing that is larger than their
homeownership portfolio (Sungu-Eryilmaz & Greenstein, 2007; Thaden, 2012). According to a
national survey of 186 CLTs in 2007, 45% of portfolios included at least some rental housing
(Sungu-Eryilmaz & Greenstein, 2007). The same survey noted CLTs that serve lower-income
people (those making less than 50% of the AMI) provide more rental units than CLTs that serve
more moderate-income people (ibid). This indicates that CLTs are able to modify their housing
portfolios based on the needs of individual communities and that they have a role in housing
that goes beyond shared-equity homeownership. Many CLTs are mixed-purpose models,
dedicating units to both homeownership and rental. This approach can broaden the reach of
CLTs in low- and moderate-income communities where some families are not yet ready or able
to transition to homeownership. CLTs operating rental housing can provide residents with
training to improve financial literacy, help build savings accounts or work on issues with their
credit history. In this way, CLTs that develop both forms of tenure are able to create a
“pipeline” of potential homeowners.
5

The Low Income Housing Tax Credit
For the last 25 years, the primary policy response to the shortage of affordable housing
has been the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC). It provides financial incentives in the form
of tax credits to invest in low-income rental housing. Since its inception in 1986, the LIHTC
program has helped finance over 2.4 million housing units (Affordable Housing Finance, 2011).
It is estimated that LIHTC plays a role in financing between 50-70% of all new contractually
affordable housing produced annually (Smith, 2002). Additionally, LIHTC developments now
accommodate more households than public housing (Schwartz, 2010: 103). Given these facts,
CLTs looking for ways to scale up production of permanently affordable rental housing cannot
help but to consider LIHTC as a potential source of funding. The LIHTC program specifically
invites nonprofit producers of affordable housing to participate in the program via a mandated
10% set-aside. In reality, nonprofits own roughly 30% of the housing produced by the LIHTC
program (Schwartz, 2010). There are concerns about maintaining long-term affordability in
projects financed with LIHTC, which will be discussed in greater detail later. Nonprofits have
been identified as more likely to have the “motivation,” but “lack the resources” required to
preserve affordability than their for-profit counterparts (Achtenberg & Norton, 2002; Bratt,
2007).
How does LIHTC work?
The federal government issues tax credits to housing finance agencies (HFAs) annually
on a per-capita basis.6 Each year, states update their qualified allocation plan (QAP), which
provides developers or “sponsors” with the “ground rules” of the competitive process they
must partake in if they wish to receive tax credits. Sponsors can be nonprofit or for-profit
entities with a range of organizational structures, including joint ventures. Developers with
projects that score the most points are awarded the credits, which are usually sold to investors
in exchange for equity. Investors get ten years of tax credits based on a project’s total
development costs. In return, properties financed with tax credits must remain affordable for
at least 15 years. Projects that fall out compliance during the first 15 years will have their tax
credits recaptured by the IRS. (Since 1989, owners must agree to keep units affordable for a
period of at least 30 years. However, after year 15, compliance monitoring becomes the
responsibility of the state HFA and tax credit recapture is no longer a consequence). The
amount of the credit depends upon the cost and location of the development and the
proportion of units that are occupied by low-income households (Schwartz, 2010: 103).7 LIHTC
can be used for new construction or to acquire and rehabilitate rental apartments, townhomes,
single family homes and single room occupancy apartments.
6

Schwartz (2011) notes, “In 2010, states could allocated $2.00 per capita per year with the amount adjusted for
inflation.”(p. 103)
7
IRS rules require that LIHTC developments must meet one of the following conditions: 1) At least 20 percent of
the units are occupied by households whose income is less than 50 percent of the metropolitan area’s median
family income, or 2) At least 40 percent of units are occupied by households whose income is less than 60 percent
of the metropolitan area’s median family income.

6

Scaling Up With Rental Housing: Why Now?
Even after a decade of continual growth, CLTs still represent a very small fraction of all
non-profit affordable housing producers.8 Cities and foundations are interested in using the
CLT model to achieve a wide variety of housing-related goals including increasing the
production of multifamily housing in cities (McCarthy, 2012; Agnotti, 2007). This is motivated
by the documented successes of CLT homeownership programs and the perception that CLTs
make the best use of limited affordable housing resources (Jacobus & Brown, 2007). The
concept of permanent affordability is getting more attention than it has in the past and has
become an important policy goal in places like California, New York and Boston (AHND, 2009).
The CLT model is considered a possible pathway to that goal.
According to the Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University’s State of the
Nation’s Housing 2012 report, there is currently a shortfall of over 5 million affordable rental
units nationwide, and this number is anticipated to grow in the coming years (p.25). In their
examination of trends in household expenditures for housing between 1960 and 1990, Quigley
and Raphael (2004: 136) note that “among poor households, 77 percent devoted more than 30
percent of their income to housing costs, while 57 percent spent over half their incomes for
housing.” These figures rose after 1980 and continued to accelerate thereafter. Widrow (1994)
points out “most policymakers applaud rising rents and falling vacancies… as signs of a growing
economy, which benefits everybody. What is not discussed is how tenants will pay large rent
increases without equally large increases in income” (p.148-149).
Despite the demonstrated need for affordable housing for low- and very low-income
households, the federal government has favored ownership over rental since the creation of
the Federal Housing Administration and has invested significant resources to ensure it remains
the dominant form of tenure (Shlay, 2006). Policies that promote single-family homeownership
for low- and moderate-income individuals have come under fire in the wake of the financial
crisis. This is not surprising, given the consequences of the crisis were disproportionately
concentrated in low-income and minority communities (Mallach, 2011). Policies that promote
low-income homeownership are embedded with expectations of accompanying increases in
neighborhood stability, property values, employment and civic participation as well as lower
rates of crime and juvenile delinquency (Shlay, 2006) to name a few. Numerous studies suggest
that these benefits—although positive—are limited and accrue primarily to homeowners at the
upper end of the low-income bracket (DiPasquale & Glaeser, 1999; Rohe & Stewart, 1996;
Hebert & Belsky, 2006). A thorough discussion of what went wrong in low-income
homeownership (exotic financial instruments, predatory lending, the overbuilding of housing,
etc.) is beyond the scope of this literature review. However, it can be said safely that fee simple

8

There are 242 CLTs operating nationwide today (Thaden, 2012). The National Congress of Community Economic
Development reported that some 4,600 CDCs—80% of which count “housing development” as one of their primary
activities--existed nationwide as of 2005 survey, although Bratt (2007) believes this number may be somewhat
overstated because it fails to account for organizations that have stopped functioning since earlier surveys.
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homeownership is not a sound strategy for housing a large portion of the population (Shlay,
2006; Davis, 2006 & 2008; McCarthy, 2012).
Davis (2008) explains the rationale for stewardship under the CLT-model of
homeownership by examining the federally mandated stewardship that is already in place for
affordable rental housing—including the housing produced by LIHTC. Thus, it provides a useful
lens for examining the synergies that exist between the ideology behind publicly assisted rental
housing and the philosophy that guides most CLTs:
Taking precautions to cope with such cyclical crises, public policy began long ago making
corrections in the way rental housing is structured and operated. As a result, we have
gradually created an expanding stock of publicly assisted, privately owned rental
housing with three protective features:
•

•

•

Affordability is perpetuated for many years, either through nonprofit ownership of
rental housing or through long-term regulatory agreements between public agencies
and private landlords by which rent increases are moderated and income eligibility is
maintained;
The safety, soundness and condition of rental housing is preserved through the
imposition of housing quality standards and through mandated replacement reserves;
and
Security of tenure is enhanced by careful screening of prospective tenants, by
requirements for just cause eviction, by vacancy reserves that insulate owners against
financial hazard if tenants default, and by periodic third-party review of the records and
practices of private landlords receiving public money to provide affordably priced
rentals for lower-income people. (Davis, 2008, p.564)

The problem is not that federal policy ignores the issues of affordability, quality and security
altogether. Federal housing policy, and LIHTC especially, is structured in a way that states
administering programs and organizations that compete for funding are encouraged to
innovate in ways that make the program work best based on local needs. The problem, which
CLTs attempt to address, is that these policies alone do not create forms of housing that ensure
that these crises are addressed on a permanent basis.
While the concept of permanent affordability may be growing in popularity, sound
strategies to ensure permanent affordability are somewhat more elusive. In October, 2009
thought leaders and practitioners from around the country working in the affordable housing
industry met at a convention in New York City sponsored by Capital One and the Ford
Foundation “to engage in a discussion of challenges and opportunities related to ensuring
permanent affordability in subsidized housing” (AHND, 2009: 4). Notes from the conference
reveal that, “much discussion occurred around the definition and implication of ‘permanence’
in affordable housing (ibid: 5).” Some defined permanence as “’as long as possible’ given the
economic challenges of underwriting a project for the very long term,” citing specifically that
expenses tend to increase at a higher rate than rents.
8

CLTs Experience as Rental Housing Developers
Ciardullo (2012) neatly unpacks the reasoning that CLTs may use when deciding to
develop rental housing. He argues that by including rental housing in their portfolios, CLTs may
be able to serve a greater portion of the population. While CLTs provide subsidies to potential
homeowners, they still require credit checks, debt-to-income requirements and other obstacles
to mortgage qualification. This may be a barrier to entry for some households. He points out,
“CLTs historically have understood that one of their roles is to stave of gentrification and the
displacement of low-income people.” Thus, rental units may be best suited to meet the needs
of community members who are most vulnerable to displacement. Ciardullo (2012) also points
out that the literature about CLTs has overwhelmingly focused on “affordability and security of
tenure,” rather than on “member involvement and control” (p.16).
Tom Agnotti (2007) compared CLT rental housing in New York City to market rate
housing and other affordable housing in the immediate area. Using case studies, he argues that
multi-family developments can help CLTs achieve “economies of scale while helping to promote
smart growth and sustainable innovative approaches to dense urban development,” all at a
lower cost than traditional city-supported homeownership endeavors. He also points out that
concentrating development in a small geographic area may lend itself to more effective
community building and organizing. Multi-family rental housing, by nature, is more likely to be
concentrated in a small geographic area than the scattered-site owner-occupied housing that
many CLTs produce. He does, however, point out the need for CLTs to develop and expand
according to their capacity and the importance of community and political support and that in
some cases success hinged upon the acquisition of land at a very low cost.
Another study of CLT rental housing evaluates the experience of tenants living in
housing produced by the Champlain Housing Trust in Burlington, VT. It appears to be the only
existing study focusing on tenants of CLT owned rental properties. In it, Gent et al. (2005) find
that CLT tenants had lower incomes relative to homeowners and spent a lower share of their
income on housing but lived in smaller units and tended to have more children. The also found
that residents were more satisfied in their CLT owned apartments than in their previous market
rate rentals. They reported being happier and safer, saving more money and living in larger,
better quality housing overall. Champlain Housing Trust owns nearly 1,500 units of rental
housing and is a partner in 38 tax-credit deals (Champlain Housing Trust, 2012).
Ciardullo (2012) found that a handful of CLTs have developed rental housing using the
LIHTC, but those tended to be larger and “more established” CLTs. Often, the parent
organization of a CLT program began using tax credits before the CLT was established (p. 41).
Of the larger CLTs that developed rental housing, “availability of funding” through LIHTC was
cited as a motivator and was used extensively by those organizations (p. 44). Some CLTs have
developed rental housing in response to the fact that some community members would
probably never qualify for mortgages (Ciardullo, 2012; Stangle, 2013). If CLTs are wishful in
thinking that their approach to homeownership can make it affordable to a wider range of
people than fee simple homeownership, they are practical in their acknowledgement that even
9

subsidized homeownership is not for everyone. In some cases, they are development partners
in an area where affordable rental housing is in short supply and no other developers are
providing it (Stangle, 2012). Ciardullo found two main reasons that CLTs give for providing
rental units: “to meet the housing needs of very low income people who cannot qualify for
mortgages and to seek out alternative sources of development funding and income to support
the organization’s operations” (p.69).
Walker (2005) explains that while the CLT model itself can be adapted to the production
of multifamily housing, “the scale of resources required for multifamily properties (the inherent
complexity of multifamily transactions in the first place) can preclude active use of community
land trust arrangements for multifamily properties (p. 8).” As Agnotti (2007) suggests, there is
valid concern that these successful experiences with CLT owned rental housing may not be
easily replicable in different housing markets. New York City has one the largest, most complex
housing systems in the country and tenant-organizations there have been well organized for
decades (Agnotti, 2007). Similarly, the Champlain Housing Trust is the largest and oldest CLT in
the nation and enjoys a high degree of municipal support.
CLTs with LIHTC Experience
Table 1, below is a list of organizations that have used LIHTC, based on my research. I
developed the list using Ciardullo’s (2012) inventory of CLTs with rental experience, shortening
it to include only CLTs with LIHTC experience based on websites and archival information of the
individual organizations. To my knowledge, no other such list exists. Drawing on a typology
Ciardullo developed, I grouped the organizations into four types of CLTs:
•

Original CLTs are nonprofits that began their work in affordable housing as CLTs.
Although, it should be noted that original CLTs may have grown out of other grassroots
organizations (as in the case of the Sawmill Community Land Trust) but in all cases, a
new nonprofit 501(c)3 organization was formed. They are distinguished from other
affordable housing organizations by three characteristics: 1) an original focus on
homeownership, 2) the use of a land-lease to permanently preserve affordability, and 3)
their structure as a membership-based community controlled organization. (Ciardullo,
2012:35)

•

Program CLTs operate as programs of nonprofit affordable housing developers such as a
CDC or CHDO. The parent organization tends to do all the rental development and
property management, while the CLT program applies to homeownership. The
organization may not operate with a democratically-run, membership based program
and a tripartite board structure. (ibid:36)
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Table 1: CLTs with LIHTC Experience
Name

Location

Age*

Staff** Rental Units

Total
Units***

Original CLTs
Athens Land Trust
Champlain Housing Trust
Irvine Community Land Trust
Sawmill Community Land
Trust

Athens, GA
Burlington,
VT
Irvine, CA
Albuquerque,
NM

18

11

120

167

29

65

1,500

2,343

7

1.5

66

67

19

6

106

194

Program CLTs
Mountainlands Community
Housing Trust
Neighborworks Blackstone
River Valley

Park City, UT

20

5.5

229

340

Woonsocket,
RI

26

17

282

311

Thistle Communities

Boulder, CO

27

24

766

1,037

Women's Community
Revitalization Project

Philadelphia,
PA

26

28

238

238

Lawrence, KS

21

4

50

104

Los Angeles,
CA

10

3

125

126

Mean:

20

17

348

473

Median:

21

9

177

181

7 to 29

3 to 65

50-1,500

67-2,343

Crossover CLT
Tenants to Homeowners, Inc.
Foundation CLT
California Community
Foundation Land Trust
*As of 2013
**Full-time equivalents

Range:

Source: Author’s own research based on Ciardullo's (2012) CLT Typology and Appendix of CLTs
***Ciardullo’s original figures did not include units that were not on CLT owned land.
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•

Crossover CLTs are CLTs that began as more traditional affordable housing developers
but later transitioned to community land trusts. (ibid:36)

•

Foundation CLTs resemble Program CLTs, except that neither it, nor its parent
foundation actually does much housing development. Instead, the CLT focuses on
investing in large rental developments and has no membership base. (ibid:37)

Compatibilities Between CLTs and LIHTC
Aside from the fact that LIHTC figures in so prominently in the financing of all affordable
rental housing and LIHTC projects are contractually obligated to remain affordable for 30 years,
the program may be attractive to CLTs and their proponents for a few reasons. First, since
LIHTC is a tax credit controlled by the IRS and not a line item controlled by Congress, it is not
impacted when austerity measures are discussed. Thus, it may be viewed as a “reliable” source
of funding that McCarthy (2012) identifies as an “obstacle to scaling up.” Thaden (2012) found
that very few CLTs are covering a majority of their operating costs through internally generated
sources of revenue. In fact, more than 70% of the CLTs in her sample (96 organizations) cover
less than 50% of their operating budget through internally generated sources (p.31). Second,
it is administered at the state level through a transparent process that allows public input. In
many ways, HFAs use the QAP process to address Davis’s (2008) concerns about “affordability,
quality and security.” They do so, for example, by prioritizing projects agreeing to extended
affordability periods, incentivizing high quality construction and ensuring that projects have
adequate vacancy reserves. Finally, it is mandated by the IRS that at least 10% of tax credits be
set aside for use by nonprofit project sponsors. The fact that nonprofits have received over
twice the mandated amount of tax credits over the life of program (Schwartz, 2010) may
indicate the strength of the non-profit system of housing delivery that has been built up around
the program (O’Regan & Quigley, 2000).
LIHTC is a Durable Source of Funding
Smith (2002) describes LIHTC as a “durable” financing source that has been “producing
and preserving for over two decades (p. 4).” He believes the durability of LIHTC can be
attributed to its “legislative countercyclicity” and the fact that it lies within the federal tax code
and not the traditional appropriation cycle (p. 4). LIHTC is outside of the scope of Congressional
housing committees and experiences changes less frequently than other housing programs. In
spite of increased concerns about tax reform9, LIHTC has become a tool that states,
municipalities and developers can more or less depend on. There are debates about the
efficiency of the LIHTC program as a means to produce affordable rental housing (McClure,
2000) and the program is not untouchable, but it is the way that most units are being built
9

Discussion about federal tax reform has increased since I began writing this thesis. While the prevailing belief is
that LIHTC will not be completely dismantled, there are concerns that the program will be heavily scrutinized as
both parties try to come up with ways to close gaps in the budget. (For a good discussion of the issue, see Kimura,
2013)
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today. If one of the obstacles that CLTs face is “identifying reliable sources of funding” as
McCarthy (2012) says, they may be drawn to LIHTC to help them overcome it.
Compared to other federal programs, (or the way that audits are done in the private
sector), compliance with the LIHTC program is costly (Lewis, 2012). However, compliance
monitoring has demonstrated its effectiveness: the LIHTC program has experienced “extremely
low levels of tax credit recapture during its history” (Novogradac, 2011). Compliance boils
down to three factors: resident selection, rent caps and documentation (Smith, 2002:49).
Because federal regulators are concerned only with outcome and not procedural compliance,
administrative costs of the LIHTC program are lower than other HUD-sponsored affordable
properties. Essentially, owners of LIHTC properties must ensure that they rent units only to
income eligible individuals at agreed upon prices and that they have all of the necessary
documentation in place to prove they did so. This procedure places the compliance burden
squarely on the owner, with large and enforceable financial penalties—namely tax credit
recapture--for non-compliance. This ensures that investors remain involved in keeping the
property in good financial condition and that the conditions of the affordability are met as
agreed upon. However, this performance is guaranteed only through year 15.10
State Level Administration and the QAP Process
Schwartz (2010) notes that one the major strengths of LIHTC is that it is “flexible enough
so that states can tailor the program to their individual needs and priorities” and is “virtually
devoid of scandal or impropriety” (p.116). QAPs must give priority to projects that serve the
lowest-income tenants and those that ensure affordability for the longest period of time
(O’Regan and Quigley, 2000: 299). Additionally, according to the Internal Revenue Code, states
are required to ensure that the credits are allocated to a property “only to extent that the
property has an economic need for the credit”11 (Novogradac, 2011:11). Aside from those
rules, states are free to incentivize goals in their QAP as they see fit, “ensuring that the program
is sensitive to local needs and political differences” (ibid: 12). HFAs integrate a wide variety of
goals such as smart growth, transit-oriented development, green building standards and
universal accessibility into their QAPs.
QAPs are drafted and then adopted via a transparent process that includes input from a
variety of stakeholders. HFAs solicit input from various stakeholders such as developers, local
governments and community development corporations in order to formulate the point system
that developers must use in order to obtain tax credits. Smith (2002) notes that “QAPs are
among the most public resource-allocation processes used in affordable housing” and that the
process “attracts an intense kind of permanent, recurring, almost professional focus from
knowledgeable local stakeholders” (p. 17). The QAP process is open to all types of affordable
10

Beginning in 1989, IRS rules changed the required affordability period from 15 to 30 years. Although after 15
years, monitoring responsibility shifts from the IRS to state HFAs, which can pursue legal action if projects fall out
of compliance, but lack the authority to reclaim tax credits.
11
In other words, that the property would not be feasible without the credit.
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housing advocates, including CLTs. They can use the process to advocate for changes in the
allocation of points that would make them more likely recipients of tax credits. The fact that
allocations are made at the state, rather than federal level, may be particularly beneficial to
non-profits, especially in states where a solid nonprofit system of housing delivery has been
developed (O’Regan and Quigley, 2000, p. 303).
10% Set-Aside for Non-Profit LIHTC Projects
IRS program rules require HFAs to allocate at least 10% of all tax credits to nonprofit
housing developers, however the literature indicates that nonprofits receive a substantially
larger portion of LIHTC funding than required. O’Regan and Quigley (2000) found that
nonprofits have received a larger portion of LIHTC funding compared to “other historically
important sources of low-income housing production” (p.313). In a profile of all tax credit
projects placed in service between 1987 and 2006, Schwartz (2010) finds that non-profit
sponsors account for 23% of all developments and 21% of all units annually (Schwartz,
2010:111). Schwartz also notes a tendency for nonprofits groups to produce smaller
developments than their for-profit counterparts (ibid, p. 112). This may be attributed to the
fact that nonprofit developers generally have fewer resources to develop or manage large
projects than similar for profit counterparts (Bratt, 2007).
Criticisms and Weaknesses of LIHTC
The LIHTC program has also endured its share of criticism. Early critics of the program
charged that too large a portion of the subsidy goes “not into bricks and mortar but into
transaction costs and investor profit” (Schwartz, 2010: 116). Stegman (1991) criticized the
program for making the underwriting process extremely complicated and cumbersome. “It
simply doesn’t make sense to have a national housing policy in which the deeper the targeting
and the lower the income group served, the more costly and complicated it is to arrange the
financing” (p. 363). Despite the complexity of the LIHTC program, research reveals it operates
more efficiently than it once did. In the early years of the program, only $0.42 of every taxcredit dollar went toward bricks and mortar development whereas this amount increased to an
average of $0.80 by 2003 and as high as $1.00 in 2006 (Schwartz, 2010: 116). There are a
handful of criticisms that are of particular interest to CLTs: the lack of income mixing in projects
financed with LIHTC, the need for additional sources of subsidy and the Year 15 issue. These
are discussed in more detail below.
Lack of Income Mixing
The ground rules of the program state that at least 20 percent of the units are occupied by
households whose income is less than 50 percent of the metropolitan area’s median family
income (AMI), or at least 40 percent of units are occupied by households whose income is less
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than 60 percent of the metropolitan area’s median family income.12 Numerous studies,
however, show that the overwhelming majority of LIHTC developments are 100% affordable
(Schwartz, 2010; Cummings and DiPasquale, 1999; O’Regan and Horn, 2012). Schwartz (2010)
adds that the regulatory requirements of the program make moving tenants between units
designated for different income levels “especially burdensome” (p.117).
This is of special interest to CLTs for a few reasons that may impact their ability to create
multiple forms of tenure or to create a “pipeline” of homeowners. More than forty percent of
LIHTC units house extremely low-income households, defined as those households earning less
than 30% of the area median income (O’Regan and Horn, 2012) and the reality is that some of
these households may never be able to transition to homeownership. This represents a
challenge and an opportunity for CLTs that must be considered before moving forward with a
decision to use LIHTC. It is important for a CLT to consider who their beneficiaries are. On one
hand, more resources may be available to serve lower income populations. On the other hand,
higher income individuals may require less stewardship than lower income individuals and thus
be less costly to serve (Davis, 2007). The key question for the organization to consider would
be whether it is more important to serve a low-income population permanently with rental
housing or to devote its resources to projects that would expand opportunities for
homeownership.
The Need for Additional Sources of Subsidy
The LIHTC program is considered a complex source of funding and multi-family housing
is inherently more complex than single-family housing at any stage in the development process.
By design, the LIHTC program is not intended to produce affordable housing on its own (Joint
Center For Housing Studies, 2009). Thus, it requires its users to layer sources of funds. This
involves time and energy spent tracking those funds down and knowledge required to utilize
them.
McClure (2000) found that three-quarters of LIHTC developments relied on public sector
support to make the financing possible (p.108) and 85% had at least one layer of subsidy in
addition to LIHTC (p.109). Khadduri, et al (2012) reported on the kinds of subsidies that LIHTC
projects layered in addition to their tax credit equity: 22% used tax exempt bonds, 32% used
project based Section 8, 23% used HOME funds and 5.6% used CDBG funds (p.74). A CLT using
tax credits is likely to find the need to layer a variety of federal, state, local or private funding
sources. Each may have its own restrictions or affordability requirements. This raises concerns
about the capacity of a CLT to use tax credits without taking on additional staff members or
reducing the attention it devotes to another line of business. Glickman and Servon (1999)
define the “capacity” of nonprofit organizations as a multidimensional term, consisting of
12

McClure (2000) notes that these requirements suggest that “the program intended for developers to set aside
some, but not all, of the units in a development for income-eligible households, leaving the remainder to be
offered at market rates” (p.97). He attributes the lack of income mixing to the fact that tax credits enable
developers to create affordable units where the financing would not otherwise be available (p.98).
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“resource, organizational, networking and programmatic elements” (p.2). That is the definition
of capacity that will be used throughout the remainder of this thesis.
Affordability and Sustainability at Year 15 and Beyond
As a means to protect public investment, IRS rules dictate that properties financed with
tax credits must remain affordable to low-income individuals for 15 years. Projects that fall out
of compliance are subject to tax credit recapture. Beginning in 1989, IRS changed the
mandated affordability from 15 to 30 years. However, investors still have the ability to opt out
at year 15 using the qualified contract process. Many states force developers to waive their
right to the qualified contract process in order to be eligible for tax credits at all.
Still, there remains concern about what happens to tax credit projects at year 15.
Khadduri, et al (2012) report that because so many states require a waiver, qualified contract
sales are “not common” and “concentrated in a few states” (p.xii). When this does occur,
properties are at risk of market-rate conversion. However, the overwhelming majority of
properties with a non-profit sponsor experience a change in ownership where the investor (or
equity partner) sells its interest to the nonprofit (general partner) (ibid: p.xiii). Properties may
continue to operate the same way they have for the last 15 years, although they may have
capital needs that may require them to refinance or re-syndicate (recapitalize with new tax
credits), depending on the extent of capital needs. Khadduri, et al. (2012) note that “nonprofit
owners usually continue to operate properties as affordable housing beyond the term of any
regulatory requirements because it is their mission to do so” (p. xiv) (emphasis added).
Applying the CLT model of permanent affordability at the front end of a tax credit deal
could render concerns about market rate conversion moot.13 However, a CLT’s presence in a
tax-credit deal will not change the fact that after 30 years, these properties may require
substantial systems upgrades and rehabilitation. Khadduri, et al. (2012) predict that while most
nonprofit-sponsored LIHTC projects placed in service in 1990 and beyond (thus carrying 30 year
affordability restrictions) will probably still have the original nonprofit owner, most will have
“large, unmet capital needs.” They speculate, “regardless of their financial condition or market
location, few—if any—properties will be able to cover their capital needs from reserves.” (ibid,
p.69). This highlights a need for proactive asset management and a plan for permanent
affordability that goes much further than staying true to an organizational mission statement.

Fortunately, there are mechanisms built into LIHTC that make it possible for forward
looking partners in a well-structured deal to plan for—if not ensure--affordability in perpetuity.
A CLT acting as a general partner in a LIHTC deal would typically be afforded one of several
13

Brandenburg (personal communication, February 27, 2013) stated that the presence of CLTs in LIHTC
partnerships “does not appear to have materially influenced the controls on affordability, beyond what one would
expect from other types of community based non-profit organizations.” Brandenburg is the former director of the
Year 15 program at Enterprise Community Partners.
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options when the 15 year affordability period comes to an end: they may enact their right of
first refusal to purchase the property at an established formula price; they may buy out the
interest of the limited partner (investor); or they may be forced to purchase the property
because of the terms of the partnership (Enterprise, 2007). Further, if a LIHTC project were
located on CLT owned land, there would be no concern of it returning to the market after 15
years. Since the cost of land is not factored into the value of tax credits, developing on CLTowned land does not have a negative impact on eligible basis of a project (and thus the amount
of tax credits that investors receive).
Alternately, there are precedents of developments funded with LIHTC being converted
to tenant ownership at the end of the initial 15-year affordability period. The success of one
such program, administered by the Cleveland Housing Network is probably due—at least in
part—to the fact that it is structured that way up-front (see Immergluck & Schaeffing, 2010).
Utah operates a lease-purchase program using LIHTC that will be discussed in the
Mountainlands Community Housing Trust case study. Nelson & Sorce (2013) add “given most
LIHTC projects are multifamily developments, which may not lend themselves to
homeownership, it can be difficult to convert LIHTC units that were not originally intended for
lease-purchase” (p.6). They found that 44 states incentivize LIHTC projects that provide
homeownership opportunities to tenants after 15 years through their QAPs (ibid:7), although
with the exception of the aforementioned examples it is unclear how many developers choose
to pursue this option in their LIHTC applications. Further, it should be noted that the
aforementioned programs have an equity building focus and do not retain any of the initial
public subsidy that is used to construct them.
Part III: Research Design and Methodology
In selecting case studies for this thesis, I looked for CLTs that had used LIHTC and had
different types of organizational structures upon their founding. My goal was to include one of
each type of CLT that I outlined above but because of time constraints and a lack of responses
from some organizations, I chose the two most common types of CLTs (an original CLT and a
program CLT). Athens Land Trust (ALT) fits the description of an original CLT. On the other end
of the spectrum, Mountainlands Community Housing Trust (MCHT) is an established nonprofit
housing developer that recently began integrating the CLT model ground lease into its
homeownership program. ALT was selected in part because it was the first example of a CLT
using LIHTC that I came across and part of the inspiration for this research.
ALT was founded in 1994 in Athens, Georgia with the goals of land preservation,
affordable, energy efficient housing and neighborhood revitalization (Athens Land Trust, 2012).
The organization became the non-profit sponsor of a 120-unit mixed-income LIHTC project with

no prior rental experience while it had only one full-time employee. The case study of ALT
demonstrates how a small, grassroots organization with very little capacity becomes a part of a
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complex real estate deal and the highlights the importance of actors committed to making a
project work.
Mountainlands Community Housing Trust (MCHT) was founded in 1993 and owns a
considerable portfolio of affordable rental and resale-restricted homeownership units in
Summit and Wasatch Counties in Northern Utah. It was founded as nonprofit affordable
housing producer rather than a CLT, but has come to use the CLT model for its homeownership
units because of the affordability and flexibility it offers. Mountainlands has participated in 5
LIHTC projects in the capacity of primary developer. Another LIHTC project, currently in the
pipeline, will attempt to utilize the CLT model ground lease as a revenue generating
mechanism.
Taken alone, each case can be considered anecdotal evidence of the kinds of practical
and ideological challenges that original CLTs interested in growing or non-CLTs interested in
applying the CLT model ground lease may encounter. Side by side, they show two dramatically
different approaches that CLTs can use to create permanently affordable rental housing using
LIHTC. While solid evidence of permanent affordability can only be achieved through time,
both organizations viewed their developments as assets that would be with their respective
communities forever. These case studies were based on open-ended interviews and intended
to spur thought and discussion about the implications that using LIHTC.
In the interviews, I discussed the following fundamental questions with the executive
directors of these two CLTs: 1) How have CLTs used LIHTC to increase the production of
permanently affordable housing? 2) What are the difficulties that arise during the development
process? 3) How are CLTs planning to keep their LIHTC projects affordable at Year 15 or 30 and
beyond? 4) Is stewardship extended to the tenants of CLT-owned LIHTC projects? If so, how?
The open-ended interviews were conducted by telephone and were approximately 60
minutes in length. Additional, follow-up information was obtained through e-mail
correspondence. Questions related to the founding of the organization, the decision to pursue
LIHTC as a source of funds and what using LIHTC has meant for the organizations in terms of
opportunities and challenges. Additional information was obtained during a similar interview
with the former director of the National CLT Network. I also reviewed available organizational
documents including newsletters, tax returns and interviews done for other publications to gain
a better understanding of how the organizations operate. Additionally, I consulted materials
developed by the Utah Housing Corporation and the Georgia Department of Community Affairs
including their QAPs, lists of tax credit applicants and local housing plans for Park City and
Athens-Clarke County in order to assess overall characteristics of the housing markets and local
affordable housing goals.

Part IV: Athens Land Trust – Athens, GA
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History, Founding and Early Activities
The Athens Land Trust (ALT) was founded in 1994 by a group of Athens-Clarke County
residents that envisioned creating a “conservation subdivision” in their own neighborhood. The
founders chose the CLT model in part because they thought it could address the “competing”
goals of housing development and open space preservation (Stangle, 2013). They learned
about the CLT model from a now defunct organization that was operating in the Atlanta area
around the same time.
ALT is the only Community Housing Development Organization (CHDO) in Athens-Clarke
County—a HUD entitlement community--and it focuses all of its housing development
programs there. Athens-Clarke County is also the smallest county in Georgia, which has been
cited as an “obstacle,” impacting the availability of land on which to develop affordable housing
(Athens-Clarke County Human & Economic Development Department, 2011). According to the
2000 census, Clarke County was home to 101,489 residents (In 1990, the census reported
87,594 people). ALT is also involved in a statewide land conservation program. It holds
conservation easements on 8,000 acres in 20 counties all throughout the state.
Stangle (2013) indicated that the founders of ALT were initially concerned about the
“pressures on affordability” that a newly created demand for “luxury student housing” was
causing in the local housing market.14 The University of Georgia’s main campus is located in
Athens. Its student body is equal to roughly 1/3 of the entire population of the town (33,078
students were enrolled in 2009). Conversions of multi-family buildings to luxury student rentals
and a city administration that was “uninterested in building affordable housing” exacerbated
the already existing shortage and led to gentrification in the Historic Hancock Corridor, a largely
African American community (Stangle, 2013).
The problem came to a head when a mobile home park located close to downtown was
purchased by an out of town developer who intended to build student housing. ALT got
involved in advocacy work surrounding the issues, trying to provide relocation services for
mobile homes and housing alternatives for its residents. Their goal was to establish a residentowned and controlled mobile home park (Stangle, 2013). This advocacy work and a growing
recognition by the founders that affordable housing should be built close to services, near
downtown (thus, avoiding sprawl) led ALT to develop single-family homes using the CLT model
(ibid). Some of their homes were built on land acquired through donations from the city. ALT
also partnered with Habitat for Humanity on a volunteer-build project that carried the
traditional CLT resale-restriction. The decision to develop single-family homes rather than
rental may have been influenced by the fact that the Mayor of Athens and county managers at
the time had no interest in bringing in any affordable housing projects (ibid).

14

Changes in the way students could spend their scholarship awards and no requirement to live on campus meant
that students suddenly had excess money for housing (Stangle, 2013).
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The Unlikely Decision to do Rental with LIHTC
Athens Land Trust used LIHTC to finance the construction of 4th Street Village, a 120unit, mixed-income apartment complex15 to help meet the affordable housing needs of a lowincome community. Construction began in 2006 and was completed in 2008. The development
has a stream running through it and won awards from the Athens-Clarke County Department of
Human and Economic Development as well as the Grow Green Coalition. With one project, ALT
effectively tripled the size of its real estate portfolio and was able to “provide a greater impact
on the community than traditional single-family development” (Stangle, 2013). 4th Street
provides “safe, decent, affordable housing” for close to 300 people, “fills a need for affordable
housing in the community” and give tenants a place where they can work on credit building,
budgeting and other steps on the path toward homeownership (ibid). ALT offers services to the
tenants and 4th Street Village that are similar to those offered to its CLT homeowners. She also
points out that, “some of the people at 4th Street Village will always be renters” and their
“incomes will never enable them on their own to purchase a house”16 (Ibid.). This illustrates
that CLTs see themselves as having a role in providing an array of options along Davis’ (2007)
“housing continuum.”
During the development process, ALT found themselves “way beyond their experience
and capacity.” Similar local agencies said there is no way an organization of the size of ALT
should be able to get a project like this done. Prior to developing 4th Street Village, its first and
only LIHTC project to date, ALT had no experience developing rental housing.17 ALT had never
considered using LIHTC as a development tool prior to being approached by a nonprofit
developer (with multiple LIHTC projects under its belt) that was interested in developing a
project in Athens. According to Stangle (2013), it is unusual for such a developer to initiate a
LIHTC deal with an organization as small as ALT, who only had 1 full-time employee at the time.
Part of the nonprofit developer’s mission was to “build the capacity of smaller non-profit
organizations to enable them to take on larger projects in their own communities” (Stangle,
2013). The developer had picked out one of the few available sites in Athens zoned for multifamily housing and wanted to partner with an nonprofit that had strong ties—politically and
personally--to the local community. ALT was the only nonprofit in the neighborhood that was
doing any significant amount of housing development (with the exception of Habitat for
Humanity, which does not generally do rental projects).
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Seventy percent is set aside for those earning less than 50% of the AMI, 10% are set aside for those earning less
than 30% and the remaining 20% of the units are considered market rate. Stangle (2013) notes that the market
rate units are typically rented to families or individuals earning between 50-80% of the AMI. In total, 96 units are
considered affordable and 26 units are considered market rate.
16
According to the Athens-Clarke County Human & Economic Development Department (2011) 28.3% of Athens
residents live below the poverty threshold, 70% of all households are renters and 56% of renters spend 30% or
more of their income on housing.
17
An ALT board member had worked with an organization that had “a bad experience with LIHTC projects”
elsewhere in Georgia.

20

The local ties meant that ALT had community—though not necessarily governmental18—
support and was able to “bring local partners and funders to the table.” This earned the
development partners additional points on their tax credit application (Stangle, 2013). ALT
used HOME funds to pay for the application process and perform pre-development work. In
addition to the extra points awarded for non-profit involvement in the project, the
development partnership tried to maximize its score by using green building features, agreeing
to extended affordability (30 years) and serving individuals earning less than 60% of the AMI.
Georgia’s Department of Community Affairs (Georgia’s HFA) denied the application the first
year it was submitted.19 The partnership decided to rework its application and try again for
funding the next year because so much time and energy had already been invested in the
process. Part of what won them the tax credits was an agreement with the Athens Housing
Authority that gave clients on its 800-person waitlist preference for some of the units at 4th
Street Village.
Expectations vs. Reality
ALT also endured difficulties due to events that are difficult to plan for, regardless of an
organization’s level of commitment or capacity to undertake a complex real estate project.
According to Stangle (2013), the bankruptcy of a large construction firm that worked on LIHTC
projects had a “domino effect” on other developers in the area. Their partner had ties to this
organization, which created doubt on the part of the equity investor about the non-profit
developer’s financial health. (“The investor was unwilling to fund the project if the non-profit
developer was a part of the deal.”) At the equity providers request, ALT moved into the
majority ownership (51%) of the general partnership and the non-profit developer stepped out
of the deal altogether. Upon departing, the original nonprofit developer suggested that ALT
partner with a local for-profit developer, Ambling Development Company. Changing
development partners mid-stream was an unforeseen event and a challenge that Stangle
(2013) described as “hair-raising,” but a “commitment” on the part of the equity provider to
getting the project done “kept it on track.”
When ALT was approached about the LIHTC deal initially, the original nonprofit had
explained that there were two ways for a nonprofit organization to be funded: either through
traditional forms of grant seeking and fundraising, or “to become a developer yourself.” ALT
funds its programming through memberships (2,000-2,500 annually), grants and fundraising.
Additional funds are generated from project fees from landowners that donate conservation
easements. ALT did not earn development fees on the many single-family homes it developed
18

Georgia’s QAP requires “local political support” for LIHTC projects. Stangle (2013) noted the county managers
did not recommend the project for approval but--in an unusual move--were overruled by the county
commissioners.
19
The application missed being awarded tax credits by 2 points. One of the points it lost was because the
development was located too close to a blighted building. (It is common for QAPs to award or subtract points for
proximity to desirable or undesirable land uses). Ironically, the blighted structure was a HUD-subsidized property
that had fallen into disrepair but had been purchased by a developer for conversion to luxury student rental
housing prior to the application being submitted (Stangle, 2013).
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because it receives HOME funds to finance its operations. Unlike many CLTs, ALT also does not
use ground lease fees to fund operations20. Stangle (2013) notes that ALT went into the 4th
Street project with the expectation that they would earn a developer’s fee. However, ALT was
forced to defer its development fee, which Stangle (2013) attributed to a “bad economy.” She
notes that the project has not been a great financial benefit to the organization. Instead, she
believes the biggest benefit that ALT has gotten from doing 4th Street is “legitimacy” as a
developer in the community. (I elaborate on this concept in the following section).
Another point that deserves some examination is ALTs relationship with the tenants of
4th Street Village. Georgia’s QAP requires an “experienced management company” to manage
LIHTC projects that it funds. This means that ALT never had the option to do its own property
management, even if its leadership may have felt that arrangement would be best for
residents. Stangle (2012) notes that with respect to renters, “in some ways, CLT is less
involved” and “we don’t know all the residents as well as we know our homeowners.” ALT
makes itself available to the tenants to answer questions about LIHTC requirements or to
resolve issues with the property management agency (which happens to be a subsidiary of the
for-profit developer). Although ALT offers many of the same services to the tenants of 4th
Street Village that it does to its CLT homeowners, there is an indication that tenants and
homeowners are viewed differently by the organization. Whereas CLT homeowners are
represented on ALTs board, tenants do not currently have a place there, although Stangle
(2013) indicates that this may be a possibility in the future. Currently ALT takes the view that
“homeowners should be able to make decisions about the land that their homes are sitting on”
and that “4th Street is a little different” (ibid).
Plans for the Permanent Affordability
ALT’s long-term strategy for 4th Street Village provides insight as to how CLTs view
permanent affordability. When asked about plans for 4th Street after 15 or 30 years Stangle
(2012) noted that the 30-year mark is “irrelevant” and that “this project will be with the
community in perpetuity. ALT retains an option to buy out the equity provider in Year 15 and
plans to assess the needs the needs of the community in the future in order to determine
whether the project will remain rental, transition to homeownership or take on some mix of
tenures.21 “At 30 years, as an organization, we will see if its time to look at homeownership or
whether the community will still need affordable rental” (Stangle, 2013). One former 4th Street
Village resident has already transitioned into CLT homeownership and others are working
toward that goal, illustrating that by developing multiple forms of tenure, CLTs can create a
“pipeline” of homeowners.
As for the question of whether ALT would partake in another project, Stangle (2013)
says, “Yes. Depending on the circumstances.” She explained that ALT would need to partner
20

ALT keeps its ground lease fees small--$5 per month—as part of its founding philosophy.
Stangle (2013) does note that multi-family buildings do not lend themselves well to homeownership in Athens,
where the general preference is for single-family detached homes.
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with the “right partner on the right project” and mentioned there is a need to build or
rehabilitate senior housing in the Athens area. However, she also notes that QAPs “do not
currently support” rehab, indicating that the available resources may not line up to meet that
community need at the present time. On any of ALTs future LIHTC projects or she were offering
advice to CLTs thinking about a LIHTC deal, Stangle mentioned several things. Most
importantly, LIHTC developments “should not just be about getting units built, but making them
great places to live” (ibid). Part of making that happen is to “make sure that the mission
statements” of the development partners “line up.” She suggests visiting other projects that
potential development partners have built to see how they are managed and stressed the
importance of working with a partner “that looks at more in a project than just the bottom line”
(ibid).
If Stangle could do one thing differently, it would be a “much more conservative proforma” especially when it comes to “estimating property taxes and vacancies” (2013). She
notes that financial projections for 4th Street were made before the housing market collapse
and that some tenants have had more issues than expected in making their rent payments. On
the subject of how to get more CLTs involved in the LIHTC program, she offered, “a QAP setaside for permanent affordability would be great because it would send for-profit developers
looking for CLTs” (ibid.). As far as the challenges of using the LIHTC program, she thinks it is a
”stressful process, but overall worth it” and that CLTs would face the same challenges as any
other nonprofit housing provider looking to fund development.
Part V: Mountainlands Community Housing Trust – Park City, UT
History, Founding and Early Activities
Mountainlands Community Housing Trust (MCHT) was founded in 1993 and owns a
diverse portfolio of affordable rental and homeownership units in Summit and Wasatch
Counties in Northern Utah. MCHT was not founded as a land trust, but uses deed restrictions
and (more recently) ground leases to achieve permanent affordability. According to its
website, “MCHT is based on the belief that a safe affordable home is often a family’s first step
toward economic self-sufficiency. MCHT addresses the dual problems of housing affordability
and availability on three fronts: acquisition and new construction of affordable housing, direct
assistance in securing housing and basic services, and education and advocacy to promote
housing policy” (Mountainlands Community Housing Trust, 2013). MCHT’s target demographic
is 80% of AMI and below, although their rental projects tend to target households at 25-40% of
AMI and some of their homeownership units are open to families earning up to 120% AMI.
Generally, their developments cater to the needs of service sector employees, single parent
families, seniors and the mentally disabled.
The cost of housing in Summit and Wasatch counties is high in part because of the
proximity of Park City (a high-priced resort community within Summit County) and Salt Lake
City (30 miles west of Park City). Although poverty rates are under 10% in each county, many
service and public sector employees earn substantially less than the median household incomes
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($84,752 and $64,651, respectively, according to the most recent American Community Survey
5 Year Estimates). In Utah, childcare workers, teachers’ aides, food service providers,
housekeeping workers and home health aides have an average median annual wage of
between $17,000 and $18,000 (Utah Workforce Housing Iniative, 2008:7).
Utah, according to MCHT’s Executive Director, Scott Loomis (2013), is progressive in its
approach to affordable housing. The Utah Housing Corportation (Utah’s HFA) implemented 99year affordability requirements on projects financed with competitive tax credits after the
conversion of some older LIHTC-financed projects to market rate housing. In 1996, the Utah
state legislature passed HB 295, which mandated that all communities and counties in the state
include an affordable housing element as part of their general comprehensive plan.
An examination of Park City’s housing plan reveals that city officials see affordable
homeownership as an opportunity to alleviate pressure on the rental market:
Renters paying close to Fair Market Rents for two and three bedroom units have
sufficient income to buy condominium units priced at about $180,000 and $250,000
respectively. About 750 or 60 percent of all renters in Park City have incomes above 50
percent of AMI. If a fraction of these higher income renters were induced by favorable
interest rates and market conditions to move to homeownership a significant number of
rental units would be freed-up thereby offsetting and alleviating some supply
constraints and pressures on the local rental market (Park City Municipal Corporation,
2012: 11).
This illustrates the opportunities for affordable homeownership in Park City and explains
MCHT’s decision to use donated land and deed restrictions to write down the cost of the singlefamily homes they develop.
MCHT has a staff of 7 and each is focused on one of the many programs that the
organization administers. In addition to developing affordable housing, MCHT monitors the
mortgage payments and sales of its resale-restricted homes and engages in advocacy work on
an ongoing basis. MCHT is the local sponsor of the USDA’s Mutual Self-Help Housing Program
in Utah. The program helps low-income participants who are unable to buy decent affordable
housing through conventional methods achieve homeownership through “sweat equity.” Six to
twelve participants work together under the supervision of a construction supervisor to build
approximately 65% of their homes. The savings from the reduction in labor costs acts as the
down payment, reduces the price of the home by approximately 20% and allows otherwise
ineligible families to own their homes. If families cannot meet their mortgage payments during
the construction phase, the funds for these payments can be included in the loan
(Mountainlands Community Housing Trust, 2013). Additionally, MCHT runs a transitional
housing program, which prevents homelessness by providing 9 temporary housing units and
supportive services for families and individuals lacking access to housing.
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Preservation and Development Using LIHTC
MCHT has used LIHTC to both preserve and develop affordable rental housing. MCHT
undertook only two small real estate projects in its first few years of operation: the founding of
a domestic violence shelter and an 8-unit development of affordable apartments through a
workforce housing obligation with nearby Deer Valley Resort called Washington Mills.
Washington Mills was developed using LIHTC in 199622 and is located within the National
Register Historic District in Park City. In 2011, the initial 15-year compliance period ended. The
limited partner in the project (Zions Bank) donated their ownership interest to MCHT, which
will ensure it remains affordable in perpetuity. As full owner of the project, MCHT can now
realize revenue from the project as well as the benefits of any depreciable expenses.
The organization won the Fannie Mae Maxwell Foundation Award for Excellence in 2003
for the acquisition and rehabilitation of the 80-unit Holiday Village Apartment complex located
in the center of Park City. The units at Holiday Village are reserved for tenants with “very low
incomes,” defined as those earning less than 50% of AMI. The project cost a total of $7.8
million and was financed with a tax-exempt bond issue (which qualified it for “as-of-right” 4%
tax credits), and loans from the Park City Municipal Development Corporation, USDA Rural
Development and the HOME program. USDA Rural Development also subsidizes rents at
Holiday Village so that residents pay only 30% of their incomes. MCHT subsequently purchased
and rehabilitated a 42-unit development in 2005 in a deal that involved many of the same
funding sources and partners. Both projects were built under the USDA Rural Development
Section 515 program. In both deals, the project’s owners contacted MCHT about the
opportunity. The original owners wanted to opt-out but were required to offer the projects to
a qualified purchaser (a nonprofit, a public entity or the tenants) before they could sell it on the
open market.
MCHT has acted as the primary developer in new construction projects utilizing LIHTC.
The choice to be the primary developer was enabled in part because of the technical expertise
possessed by Loomis. Loomis was a lawyer for 20 years and routinely involved in complex real
estate transactions (Loomis, 2013). Most organizations do not have built in access to such a
skill set. The prior director of MCHT possessed no LIHTC experience and got the organization
involved in a tax credit project which incurred legal, consulting and accounting expenses of
$240,000, the highest for any tax credit project in Utah state history (Loomis, 2013). Loomis
(2013) believes that LIHTC projects are so complicated, with so much to keep track of, “you
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The project cost $1,156,405 and was financed with state and federal housing tax credits, a HOME loan, a State
Housing Trust Fund loan, an equity contribution from Deer Valley Resort. Park City Municipal Corporation waived
$24,000 in fees (Mountainlands Community Housing Trust, 2011).
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can’t spread it around too much.” MCHT’s LIHTC experience has not been without any pitfalls.
The organization was forced to defer its entire development fee on an $11 million project
undertaken in 2012 because of a loss of tax credits due to construction overruns and late
delivery.23
As an overarching philosophy, MCHT’s commitment to permanent affordability appears
to take precedence over equity building, although it has participated in programs that
emphasize the latter. MCHT was selected by the Utah Housing Corporation to participate in its
CROWN (CRedits-to-OWN) lease-to-purchase program. CROWN is an innovative use of LIHTC
where tenants can purchase their home after a fifteen-year rental period. During the rental
period, tenants pay 50-60% of fair market rents each month. At the end of 15 years (the initial
LIHTC affordability period) tenants become homeowners by purchasing the home for an
estimated $110,000 to $120,000. MCHT used CROWN to construct 8 single-family homes at
cost of about $185,000 each (including land and construction). At least 50% of the cost of the
project was paid for by LIHTC (Loomis, 2013). Participants in the program stand to come away
with a significant amount of equity after 15 years. In the 8 years since the homes were built,
Loomis (2013) estimates they are worth “at least double, if not more.” This highlights a tension
that comes up when an organization committed to permanent affordability uses a lease-to-own
program with tax credits. While most tax credits projects in Utah create units with 60 to 99
years of affordability, the CROWN program only offers 15. At the end of 15 years, the units are
no longer affordable housing. Loomis has been in the process of negotiating with state officials
to modify the program via a ground lease arrangement in order to ensure ongoing affordability
in the projects. At th e end of the 15-year rental period, the potential homeowner would enter
into a long-term ground lease with resale restrictions with MCHT, thus extending the life of the
initial public subsidy. He has proposed using donated land to bring the up-front cost of the
projects down even further.
Looking Ahead
MCHT plans to continue to working toward its mission statement on all three fronts, but
is likely to use the CLT model ground lease more often in the future because of the flexibility it
affords. According to Loomis (2013) MCHT is in the process of putting together a LIHTC deal
that will utilize a ground lease to “maintain control of land” donated by the city and help to
“generate income” for the organization. The land has been valued at $578,000. Rather than
contributing the land directly to the deal, MCHT would enter into a land lease with the
development partnership and charge an upfront lease fee of $20-25,000 (which would cover
the construction period) and a monthly fee while the development is in operation. He
envisions the arrangement generating a 3% return on the land (and thus income to MCHT)
“forever” (Loomis, 2013). He adds that land leases are always a “dilemma” in terms of pricing:
Charging too much reduces the funds available to pay debt service and charging too little
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According to Loomis (2013), organizations “live for” developer’s fees and they are “great if you can get them.”
However, he says that they function as a “second contingency” and can be subject to deferral when projects run
into difficulties.
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defeats the purpose of the arrangement. He is not aware of any other organizations that have
used a similar financing mechanism and was provided with the ground lease by his tax credit
syndicator (ibid).
Loomis also offered that until recently, MCHT’s notion of stewardship was limited to
monitoring mortgage payments and re-sales. Lately, however, there is a lot more discussion
about services for tenants and homeowners in terms of education, credit building and
proactively maintaining units. Loomis (2013) suggests that using a land lease has allowed MCHT
to become “much more involved” in the managing the properties they sell. The land leases
allow MCHT to inspect the properties and collect a reserve, should the homeowner need access
to capital for upgrades and improvements. MCHT was recently awarded a Cornerstone
Homeownership Opportunity Program (CHIP) grant, which will “substantially increase outreach
to potential homeowners, increase stewardship of existing and new units and expand MCHT’s
service to its stakeholders and target market” (Mountainlands Community Housing Trust,
2013).
Finally, in addition to acting as developer and steward, MCHT also sees itself having a
role as an educator within the local development community at large. Relatively new
inclusionary zoning ordinances require developers to set-aside portions of subdivisions as
affordable rental or homeownership units. Loomis (2013) says that MCHT has a stake in making
sure those developments are successful and their principle role is showing for profit developers
how those units are financed. He also states that there are ongoing opportunities to educate
the public about resale-restricted homeownership and that some people still tend to view it as
“punishing poor people” by preventing them from taking all of the equity out of an affordable
home (ibid).
Part VI: Comparison & Lessons Learned
The ALT and MCHT case studies demonstrate the ways that organizations with different
approaches to the development of permanently affordable housing have used LIHTC to expand
their portfolios. ALT was founded as a CLT, while MCHT was founded as a more traditional nonprofit affordable housing producer and has recently come to utilize the CLT model ground lease
because of the flexibility and control it offers. While both organizations view LIHTC as a
pathway to permanent affordability, they differ in their views of stewardship and community
control. In the following section, I highlight a number of findings or lessons learned from these
case studies and group them according to my initial research questions.
How have CLTs used LIHTC to increase the production of permanently affordable housing?
The organizations studied have collectively used LIHTC for preservation and
development, as part of a lease purchase program and as a component of a lease-purchase
program. There are clearly many ways for CLTs to utilize LIHTC to increase the supply of
permanently affordable housing. Based on the stories of what could potentially go wrong in a
tax credit deal and the significant amount of time, money and energy that goes into the
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process, the extent to which LIHTC represents a “good opportunity” for a CLT to do so
depends upon the resources of the organization. MCHT’s acquisition of Parkside Apartments
took 3 and half years to complete because of all of the funding sources involved. It took ALT
over 3 years from the start of the application process to get 4th Street Village built. It is possible
that in doing their respective LIHTC deals, the organizations passed up other development
opportunities by choosing to do their respective LIHTC deals but they met an important
community need in the process.
1.

LIHTC projects should not be undertaken solely for the sake of a development fee.

Organizations can use LIHTC to increase the supply of rental housing in their service
areas (and the size of their portfolios) rather quickly, but based on these case studies, they
should not do so with the expectation they will earn a development fee. ALT went into their 4th
Village project with that expectation and has yet to see a development fee 4 years after the
project was completed. Even MCHT, with an experienced real estate attorney at their helm,
was forced to defer most of their development fee on their most recent LIHTC project even
after completing 4 previous LIHTC projects. As Stangle (2013) acknowledged, 4th Street Village
has not been a great financial benefit to the organization but it has given them “legitimacy” as a
developer in the community. 4th Street Village is an attractive, award winning development
that has performed well. It also met a very important need in a community where no one else
was building affordable rental housing. If legitimacy means the ability to attract more funds for
development, there may be some value in forgoing a development fee in exchange for the
development experience and opportunity to increase the output of affordable housing in the
future.
2.

There is no standard CLT approach to LIHTC development.

The CLT approach to rental housing financed without LIHTC seems relatively
straightforward. A CLT may own the land or the land and the structure. They may rent
individual units in a building to tenants via traditional 1-year leases or may rent an entire
building to a third-party who then leases units to individuals. However, it would appear that
there is no CLT model of LIHTC development that has been widely applied by organizations
interested in maximizing permanent affordability, integrating stewardship and maintaining
community control of land. The lack of a standardized approach points to the fact that LIHTC is
such a flexible source of funding to allow for and even encourage multiple forms of
development partnerships, site control and outcomes as far as the ultimate form of tenure
when the mandated affordability period expires. It is possible that MCHT’s forthcoming tax
credit project using the CLT model ground lease could serve as blueprint for LIHTC projects
undertaken by CLTs. While its application may be limited to specific situations, it is promising in
terms of the site control it offers (many CLT-sponsored LIHTC projects are not necessarily
developed on CLT-owned land) and its revenue generating potential. By owning the land under
the project, a CLT has the opportunity to collect a ground lease fee from the development
partnership. Successful application of this mechanism may offset foregone development fees.
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There was an acknowledgement from both ALT and MCHT that there would always be a
need for affordable rental housing in the communities that they serve. Each organization sees
affordable rental housing as a public good that should be kept with the community in
perpetuity. This would be expected of an organization like ALT, which was initially founded as
Community Land Trust and possibly implied by MCHT’s mission statement. It could be that
MCHT’s commitment to permanent affordability is influenced by Utah’s 99-year land use
restriction on projects financed with tax credits. However, it has moved toward the CLT model
ground lease in its homeowner project because it is “more flexible” and offers “more control”
than the deed restrictions that it used previously (Loomis, 2013).
What are the difficulties that arise during the development process?
Using Glickman and Servon’s (1999) definition of the “capacity” of nonprofit
organizations as a “multidimensional term, consisting of resource, organizational, networking
and programmatic and political elements,” it can be said that a LIHTC project requires an
organization to utilize and increase at least several facets of its capacity. ALT formed a
partnership with an experienced developer to make up for its lack of tax credit experience and
also received some pro bono legal services, which is consistent with the way that Bratt (2007)
explains why development partnerships are formed. MCHT had a significant in-house resource
in its executive director, whose background as a real estate attorney has enabled the
organization to play the role of lead developer on several deals.
The political attitudes toward affordable housing in each case were at opposite ends of
the spectrum. Whereas MCHT’s efforts have enjoyed support at the state and local level for
some time, Athens initiated the 4th Street project when a mayor hostile to the development of
affordable housing was in office. Any number of internal and external factors could have
influenced the success of the projects. The commitment to seeing the projects succeed on the
part of a few key actors cannot be understated, but it is difficult to measure. It is also likely that
once tax credits are awarded, the threat of recapture that Smith (2002) outlines takes effects
and that the actors (and investors especially) have an incentive to make the project work. All of
the intangibles aside, both Stangle and Loomis agreed that good development partnerships
could result in a successful project.
3.

Development partnerships should be about more than the bottom line.

Loomis (2013), Lewis (2012) and Stangle (2013) all suggest that organizations without
tax credit experience but considering LIHTC as a source of development funding co-develop
with an experienced organization and split the development fee. Loomis (2013) suggests
looking for a partner who has done multiple projects and have been successful in terms of
compliance and project performance. According to Loomis (2013), the major pitfall to avoid is
committing to things during the application process for the sake of getting QAP points that will
cause the project hardship down the line. In 2012, Loomis was approached by a tax credit
investor that was interested in having MCHT co-develop a 23-unit senior living project financed
using LIHTC with the Wasatch County Housing Authority. Drawing on his prior experience,
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Loomis was able to correct errors in the application process that he believes “would have lived
with the project forever” (Loomis, 2013). For example, he adjusted targeted income levels on
several units upwards (from 25% AMI to 40%) and brought a proposed 62+ age restriction down
because these stipulations would have made it difficult to lease up the building (ibid). He
stressed the importance of an accurate market study, noting a tendency for a developer to do a
market study that makes things look good on paper. He assured that “tax credit investors
always do a third party market study” (ibid). One of the major challenges of using LIHTC is that
tax credit investors are usually interested in doing larger (75-100 unit) projects, whereas
organizations like MCHT (smaller organizations or those operating in rural areas) are often
interested in doing smaller (20-30 unit) projects.
LIHTC projects are extremely complex and can get costly in terms of legal, accounting
and consulting fees. A lack of experience would like drive those costs upwards, as Loomis
noted was the case under MCHT’s prior executive director. Working with a developer who had
tax credit experience could help contain those costs. Stangle (2013) and Loomis (2013) agree
on a few other features that CLTs should look for in a development partner: a portfolio of wellperforming projects, high-quality construction and an organization whose mission statement
aligns with a CLT. Stangle (2013) said that in the future, she would look for a development
partner whose primary concern was building not “just apartments, but great places to live.”
Making a LIHTC development a great place to live might involving the addition of amenities that
would both score extra QAP points while improving the physical appearance and quality of the
apartments. Loomis (2013) warns that developers must walk a tight line when it comes to
committing to extra project amenities, as they can make a project too expensive to finance.
Partnerships with organizations who own well performing projects could help CLTs with limited
capacity to avoid these pitfalls.
4.

Community control is not necessarily achieved through the direct ownership of land in a
LIHTC deal.

If control of land within a community is paramount to a CLT, it must be noted that it is
not automatically achieved by developing affordable housing using LIHTC. The project and the
land it sits on is almost wholly owned (typically by a margin of 99% to 1%) by the tax credit
investor until such time as the investor chooses to sell or convey its interest to the nonprofit
partner. It is very common for nonprofits to assume full ownership after 15 years (Enterprise,
2007; Khadduri, et al, 2012) but due to the initial ownership structure and the rules of the LIHTC
program, they have very little control over what happens to a project before then. ALT does
not own the land where 4th Street Village was developed, although they have the option to
purchase the entire project at year 15. Loomis (2013) is unaware of other CLTs that use a
ground lease in a LIHTC project.
This also means that there is potential for conflict between the CLT, the property
management company and the community at large. Investors are required to keep the
property in good financial order or they risk losing tax credits. They do so, in part, by passing
off some of the compliance monitoring and day-to-day tenant relations to a property
30

management firm. Neither the investor nor the management firm can afford to be a
sympathetic landlord due to their fiduciary responsibilities and the risk of tax credit recapture.
ALT mitigates this tension by extending stewardship services to the tenants of 4th Street Village,
but also incurs additional expenses to do so (Stangle, 2013).
How are CLTs planning to keep their LIHTC projects affordable at Year 15 or 30 and beyond?
5.

Permanent affordability is presumed but not necessarily planned for.

For both organizations, permanent affordability of their LIHTC projects (as well as their
homeownership projects, for that matter) was a foregone conclusion. ALT and MCHT are
obligated by their mission statements to keep their projects affordable in perpetuity. However,
neither mentioned any specific financial mechanisms or solid plans for the projects when
mandated affordability periods expired. ALT kept the options for the future of 4th Street Village
open and explained that the direction that the project would take would depend upon the
future needs of the community. On the other hand, MCHT believed that their rental housing
would always remain rental housing. In a resort economy, there will always be a need for
affordable rentals and further, all of MCHT’s rental projects are multi-family attached buildings
that would probably never easily lend themselves to homeownership options. Also, most have
mandated affordability periods of 50 to 99 years.24 It appears that CLT sponsored LIHTC
projects do not differ materially from projects sponsored by other nonprofit organizations in
terms of guaranteed affordability.
Is stewardship extended to the tenants of CLT-owned LIHTC projects? If so, how?
ALT and MCHT both offer rental and homeownership opportunities within their service
areas. Inherent in this dual approach to affordable housing is the recognition that CLT
homeownership is not for everyone and that there will always be a need for affordable rental
housing. ALT offers stewardship services to its 4th Street Village tenants that are similar to the
services offered to its CLT homeowners, which shows an interest in strengthening the
community by improving the self-sufficiency of its members. Since ALT was founded as a CLT, a
commitment to stewardship would have been an integral part of the organization from the
beginning. On the other hand, MCHT has only recently recognized the importance providing
stewardship services. Originally, it felt that it was doing enough if mortgage payments were
made on time and resale restrictions were enforced. MCHT was recently provided a grant that
will increase its capacity to undertake stewardship activities for its homeowners. It remains
unclear whether it will offer similar services to renters or will attempt to create the “pipeline”
of homeowners via its tenants. This may be traced back to the fact that MCHT is not a CLT by
design but uses a CLT model ground lease in its operations. It may be that the organization
incorporates more proactive stewardship into its programming as it matures.
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In Utah, projects financed with competitive 9% tax credits are required to remain affordable for 99 years, while
projects financed with “as-of-right” 4% credits are required to remain affordable for at least 55 years.
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In both cases, tenants do not enjoy any special representation on the boards of the
organizations. This is not surprising, given that Thaden (2012) reports that many CLTs do not
count the owner of a CLT owned home as a board member. If the empowerment of
homeowners via a spot on a board of directors is still somewhat elusive, it is probably even
further off for renters. Stangle (2013) indicates that ALT’s belief is that “homeowners should be
able to make decisions about land their home is sitting on” while for renters it is “a little
different.” Even in a CLT-owned rental apartment, tenants and homeowners are viewed
somewhat differently. Empowerment activities are put in place to move tenants out of renting
and into homeownership, which affords them a stronger voice in land-related decisions. MCHT
is not a classic CLT and does not have a tripartite board structure. Neither homeowners nor
tenants are represented on its board.
Conclusion
Davis (2010) offers an observation about the future of the CLT movement that serves as
an appropriate starting point for the conclusion of this thesis:
As the number, size, and diversity of CLTs grow, the model is being pushed beyond the
ideological, organizational, and operational boundaries that once defined it. As the
number, size, and diversity of CLTs grow, the model is being pushed beyond the
ideological, organizational, and operational boundaries that once defined it. By
cultivating a shared understanding of the model’s origins, including the ideas and values
underlying its many variations, we make it easier for distant CLTs to find a common
identity and pursue a common agenda (Foreward).
The LIHTC program is one source of funding CLTs can use to substantially increase their
rental portfolios. The case studies presented here show that there is no one-size-fits-all
approach to using LIHTC, but that it is complicated and requires a significant investment of
other financial and non-financial resources. The main limitation of this thesis is that more case
studies of different types of CLTs were not presented. More case studies may have revealed
additional commonalities in the positive and negative experiences that CLTs tend to have when
using LIHTC. A second limitation is the lack of uniformity in the interviews. A lack of uniformity
is be expected when examining multi-family affordable housing development processes but
may be further complicated by the fact that LIHTC is administered at the state level resulting in
what Khadduri, et al (2012) dubbed “50 flavors of process.” To reiterate, I argue that this
feature of LIHTC makes it attractive and demonstrates how flexible the program can be in
accommodating innovation. As CLT-led innovation within the LIHTC program occurs, it should
be documented and shared among professionals via the National CLT Network, which both
executive directors pointed to as a valuable resource. This will also give CLTs the credibility
they need to argue the case for permanent affordability at the state level in order to compete
more effectively for tax credit allocations in the future.
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This thesis highlights a gap in the existing literature on CLTs by showing that
mechanisms to ensure permanent affordability, stewardship and community control are not
necessarily built in features of LIHTC deals undertaken by CLTs. The use of a funding source
with so many strings attached will force CLTs to consider how they simultaneously branch out
into new forms of tenure and adhere to their founding principles. There a number of
disposition strategies available to non-profit partners in LIHTC deals that will result in full
ownership of a project after 15 years, but less is written about how to keep these projects
financially healthy on a permanent basis. Additional research that addresses some of the best
practices in long-term sustainable asset management is needed to expand on this topic. Most
LIHTC projects undertaken by CLTs are probably not old enough to for researchers to conduct a
robust analysis of how CLT-sponsored projects tend to perform over the long term, but there is
room to examine the ways in which other organizations are planning for the idea of
permanence. The impacts of stewardship on residents of CLT owned rental housing is also an
area of study that could be expanded upon.
Finally, the notion of community control is a defining feature of CLTs, but it is unclear
how it plays out in LIHTC projects especially in light of the fact that projects can be developed
on land that is not CLT-owned. How would voting members of a CLT make decisions about a
development that is partially owned (by very wide margins) by a corporate investor that has no
ties to the community? While this question is theoretical and unrelated to the physical output
of affordable housing units, defining the ways that community control is achieved deserves
attention if CLTs are to distinguish themselves from CDCs and other well-intentioned non-profit
producers of affordable housing.
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